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ABSTRACT
The objective of this paper is to assess proposed transuranic waste accident analysis guidance 
and recent software improvements in a Windows-OS version of MACCS2 that allows the 
inputting of parameter uncertainty. With this guidance and code capability, there is the potential 
to perform a quantitative uncertainty assessment of unmitigated accident releases with respect to 
the 25 rem Evaulation Guideline (EG) of DOE-STD-3009-94 CN3 (STD-3009). Historically, the 
classification of safety systems in a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facility’s safety 
basis has involved how subject matter experts qualitatively view uncertainty in the STD-3009 
Appendix A accident analysis methodology. Specifically, whether consequence uncertainty 
could be larger than previously evaluated so the site-specific accident consequences may 
challenge the EG. This paper assesses whether a potential uncertainty capability for MACCS2 
could provide a stronger technical basis as to when the consequences from a design basis 
accident (DBA) truly challenges the 25 rem EG.
INTRODUCTION
Part of the work for the classification of safety systems in a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 
nuclear facility’s safety basis has involved how subject matter experts qualitatively view 
uncertainty in the accident analysis calculations in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94 CN3 
(STD-3009) Appendix A. Specifically, the magnitude of the qualitative uncertainty in a site-
specific accident scenario’s consequence analysis may force a conclusion that the 25 rem 
Evaulation Guideline (EG) is challenged. Two recent events may help to move the assessment of 
STD-3009 accident analysis uncertainty to a quantitative technical-based methodology. The first 
is the development of a new DOE standard for the preparation of documented safety analysis 
(DSA) for transuranic (TRU) waste facilities. The second is ongoing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) sponsored improvements to MACCS2 code package, which is also part of 
DOE’s “toolbox” of high-use safety software codes.
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DOE’s TRU waste facilities in the past have often employed a variety of different controls to 
manage the TRU wastes even though they face similar hazards and scope of operation. The 
recognition of these inconsistencies has led DOE to develop a new technical standard with, in 
part, specific technical expectations for analyzing TRU waste hazards from which the need for 
controls is demonstrated. This new DOE standard also provides additional direction on whether a 
calculated dose for a specific scenario should be considered as “challenging” the EG, depending 
on the conservatism in the accident analysis.
The NRC sponsored MACCS2 code improvements includes a version of the MACCS2 code 
known as WinMACCS. This version of MACCS2 can operate on Windows-based personal 
computers via a user interface, but also can allow the entering of uncertainty distributions for 
most input parameters. A beta version of WinMACCS is reviewed for its potential application 
for aiding DOE’s accident analysis 
The objective of this paper is to assess whether the combination of additional guidance from the 
new DOE standard and the potential improvements in a DOE toolbox consequence code has the 
potential to allow a quantitative uncertainty assessment of unmitigated accident releases with 
respect to the EG for LLNL TRU waste facilities.
SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY IN DOE-STD-3009 ACCIDENT ANALYSES
The guiding radiation dose equation from STD-3009 compliant accident analysis has been the 
radioactive airborne source term five factors with an additional three consequence analysis 
factors.1 These are:
QDCFBRLPFDRRFARFMARD ICRPMOI c×××××××= 72][ (Eq. 1)
Where:
· MAR is the material-at-risk, namely the amount of radionuclides available to be acted on 
by a given physical stress (Curies),
· ARF∙RF is the airborne release fraction times the respirable fraction (unitless),
· DR is the damage ratio or fraction of the MAR that is impacted by the postulated accident 
scenario (unitless),
· LPF is the leak path factor (unitless),
· BR is the breathing rate (m3/s),
· DCFICRP 72 is the inhalation dose conversion factor based on International Commission on 
Radiological Protection 72 (rem/Curie), and
· χ/Q is the atmospheric dilution factor (s/m3).
For LLNL TRU waste facilities, the prior experience has been to apply the currently available 
version of the MACCS2 code package to determine the three right-hand factors on an unit value 
basis, namely the QDCFBR ICRP c×× 72 factors as a unit source term-to-dose conversion factor 
in rems per plutonium-239 equivalent curies (PE-Ci) for the particular type of radiological 
releases being examined in accident analysis section of the documented safety analysis (DSA) 
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(i.e., ground release or fire with plume rise). Because MACCS2 applies the DCFs from Federal 
Guidance Report (FGR) 11 and FGR 12 (Reference # MACCS2 manual), it is LLNL’s practice 
to apply an additional scaling factor to modify the MACCS2-obtained unit source term-to-dose 
conversion factor to a FGR 13-based value.2
Recently, DOE completed a new standard through the RevCom process that provides guidance, 
in part, on how and why the source term five factors will be expected to be set for each 
anticipated accident scenario being considered in a TRU waste DSA.3 For radiological 
consequence modeling, the new DOE standard requires the following dispersion attributes:
· The values of χ/Q used for radiological and chemical consequence analysis are generated 
using MACCS2 Computer Code (see DOE-EH-4.2.1-MACCS2-Code Guidance, 
MACCS2 Computer Code Application Guidance for Documented Safety Analysis). Use 
of other DOE-approved Toolbox Codes , or site-specific codes that have undergone 
appropriate validation and verification in accordance with DOE O 414.C requirements on 
software quality assurance, must be technically justified.
· Worst case meteorological assumptions (i.e., 95th percentile based on local site data) for 
onsite radiological and chemical releases (see DOE-STD-3009, Appendix A for offsite 
evaluations)
· Dry deposition velocity must be used at a value of 1 cm/s for all unfiltered, non tritium, 
non-noble gas species.
· Wet deposition must not be modeled.
· A surface roughness value of 3 cm must be assumed for radiological and chemical 
releases.
· Building wake effects must not to be credited (modeled) unless shown to yield more 
conservative or bounding results.
· Plume buoyancy may only be used when modeling fires that are outdoors or venting 
through a large breach in the facility (use of plume buoyancy should not be credited in a 
non-conservative manner).
· The breathing rate value, as specified in the DOE Toolbox Codes, is 3.3 x 10-4 m3/s. This 
value corresponds to the light activity breathing rate for adults and must be used in 
consequence assessment.
· Inhalation dose conversion factors for the maximally exposed offsite individual (MOI) 
evaluation must be consistent with ICRP 72, Age-dependent Dose to Members of the 
Public from Intake of Radionuclides: Part 5 Compilation of Ingestion and Inhalation 
Dose Coefficients, and optionally may use ICRP 68, Dose Coefficients for Intakes of
Radionuclides by Workers, for the collocated worker evaluation.
The new DOE standard also outlines the known sources of uncertainty for each source term and 
consequence analysis factors. Based on the information provided in the new DOE standard, there 
are only, at most, the DR and χ/Q terms that require consideration for an uncertainty analysis. All 
others should be bounded or conservative.3 This can be reduced to one factor if the accident 
analysis assumptions and selections of the DR for each scenario are properly developed (i.e., 
bounding or conservative for the scenario). Therefore, for TRU waste facilities, the uncertainty 
analysis could concentrate on assessing the atmospheric dilution factor, χ/Q, for demonstrating 
whether there is the potential for challenging the EG.
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UNCERTAINTY IN DISPERSION MODELS 
Addressing uncertainty is widely recognized as a key part of dispersion modeling, especially in 
light of hazard analysis moving toward probabilistic results as a valuable tool for decision-
making and optimizing the use of resources. There have been many papers and journal articles 
over the years addressing various issues revolving around the determination of uncertainty in 
dispersion models. The purpose of this paper is not to revisit this subject.  Rather, two articles are 
recommended for those wishing to understand the sources of uncertainty and for an example of 
recommendations in characterizing the uncertainty in dispersion models.  The articles are by K. 
Shankar Rao entitled “Uncertainty Analysis in Atmospheric Dispersion Modeling” and by John 
S. Irwin and Steven R. Hanna entitled “Characterizing Uncertainty in Plume Dispersion 
Models”.4,5
FUTURE UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS CAPABILITIES WITHIN MACCS2
MACCS2 has been designated as part of a DOE "toolbox"of high-use safety software codes.6 A 
Windows-based version of MACCS2, known as WinMACCS, is under development that 
provides a graphical user interface to MACCS2. WinMACCS would allow for a more intuitive 
and efficient manner to create or modify MACCS2 input files, run the code, evaluate results, and 
to support uncertainty analysis.7, 8, 9 A beta version of WinMACCS is used in this paper only as 
an initial tool to help develop a quantitative uncertainty analysis process of the χ/Q consequence 
analysis factor.
A number of uncertainty distribution types (up to thirty) may be available for uncertainty 
analysis of up to approximately 147 input parameters among all four modules (ATMOS, EARLY, 
CHRONC, and COMIDAC2). A Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) routine randomly determines 
an input parameter’s value from its uncertainty distribution for each MACCS2 run/simulation 
performed during the uncertainty analysis. An analyst should also be able to correlate dependent 
input parameters to each other so the LHS routine does not produce combinations of unphysical 
values between the correlated input parameters. Additionally, once the NRC-sponsored 
MACCS2 development work is complete later this year, a user manual and/or modeling 
document may be available that further outlines the sources of uncertainty with technical 
guidance on assigning uncertainty distributions within the MACCS2 code package. 
PROPOSED METHOD FOR ASSESSING UNCERTAINTY
In developing a proposed method for assessing the χ/Q uncertainty, the following will need to be 
evaluated:
1. Determine which MACCS2 modules are applied for the site-specific accident analysis,
2. Verify the input parameters for the MACCS modules of concern, which can be included 
in the uncertainty analysis or removed from the uncertainty assessment based on DOE 
guidance, the specific scenario assumptions, and/or by site-specific conditions, 
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3. For the remaining input parameters, establish their uncertainty distribution type and 
associated input values,
4. Determine if the selected input parameters are dependent (i.e., they have a relationship 
that must be accounted for during the LHS step of the uncertainty analysis) and, if so, 
establish their “Correlation Coefficients,” and
5. Perform necessary MACCS2 runs/simulations and document the results.
These steps are proposed to focus the uncertainty analysis to those MACCS2 input parameters 
that should truly affect the uncertainty. To demonstrate their use, they will be applied to a 
previous MACCS2 calculation performed at LLNL.
LLNL SITE-SPECIFIC EXAMPLE
The previous LLNL safety calculation applying MACCS2 that will be applied as the test case for 
this study is an aircraft crash with an ensuing fire involving 90 gallons of gasoline.10 The MOI 
for this case is at the LLNL fenceline at a distance of approximately 150 m. The MACCS2 input 
values from this calculation were entered into a WinMACCS input deck and run for the baseline 
case. The resulting baseline consequence dose from a 1 PE-Ci source term to the MOI at the 
nearest fence line (0.1 to 0.2 km in the NE direction) is a 95th percentile value of 1.12E-1 Sv, or 
11.2 rem/PE-Ci.
Using this calculation as the example, the proposed steps of the uncertainty analysis are as 
follows:
1. Selection of the MACCS2 Modules to Include in the Uncertainty Analysis
Because the guidance in DOE-STD-3009 for accident analysis specifically concerns short-term 
radiological exposure to the MOI via the inhalation pathway, only the input parameters for the 
ATMOS and EARLY modules need to be evaluated in the uncertainty analysis.
2. Identifying the Potential Input Parameters for Uncertainty Analysis
WinMACCS displays whether an input parameter can have an uncertainty distribution if the 
“Make Uncertain” button is activated. For the LLNL example, there are a total of forty input 
parameters between the ATMOS and EARLY modules as shown in Table 1 that could have 
uncertainty distributions assigned to them. 
General assumptions or requirements from accident analysis guidance or by site-specific 
conditions in the scenario set the values for many input parameters.1, 3 Such input parameters 
would be removed from further consideration in the uncertainty analysis.  Examples from Table 
1 of these input parameters are:
· Breathing Rate (BRRATE): The new DOE standard sets this input parameter specifically 
to 3.3E-4 m3/s and excludes all other values.3
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· Boundary Weather Rain Rate (BNDRAN): Wet deposition beyond the specified distances 
is defined; however, all wet deposition is excluded from DOE accident analysis.1
· Particle Size Distribution (PSDIST): The parameter only involves monodisperse 
particulate of concern.10
Table 1 MACCS2 Input Parameters under Consideration for Uncertainty Analysis
No Module Section Sub-Section Parameter Definition
1 ATMOS Deposition Dry Deposition VDEPOS Dry Deposition Velocities
2 Dispersion Dispersion Function CYSIGA Linear Coefficient - σy (6 Classes)
3 CYSIGB Exponential Term - σy (6 Classes)
4 CZSIGA Linear Coefficient - σz (6 Classes)
5 CZSIGB Exponential Term - σz (6 Classes)
6 Scaling Factors YSCALE Scale Factor- Horizontal Dispersion
7 ZSCALE Scale Factor - Vertical Dispersion
8 Plume Specs Time of Releases PDELAY Plume Release Times
9 Plume Meander Data TIMBAS Time Base - Plume Expansion 
10 BRKPNT Breakpoint Time - Plume Meander
11 XPFAC1 Base Time - Meander Expansion 
12 XPFAC2 Breakpoint - Expansion Factor 
13 Plume Rise Data SCLCRW Scaling Factor - Critical Wind Speed
14 SCLADP Scaling Factor - A–D Plume Rise
15 SCLEFP Scaling Factor - E–F Plume Rise
16 Wake Effect Data BUILDH Reactor Building Height
17 SIGYINIT Initial Value of σy
18 SIGZINIT Initial Value of σz
19 Release Release Info OALARM Off-Site Alarm Time
20 Description Plume Parameters REFTIM Plume Reference Time Point
21 Particle Size Distrib. PSDIST Particle Size Distribution by Group
22 Inventory Scale Factor CORSCA Linear Scaling Factor-Core Inventory
23 Plume Segment Release 
Fractions
RELFRC Release Fractions of the Source Term
24 Weather Boundary Conditions BNDMXH Boundary Weather Mixing Layer Ht.
25 BNDRAN Boundary Weather Rain Rate
26 BNDWND Boundary Weather Wind Speed
27 Samples per Day NSMPLS Number of Weather Samples per Bin
28 EARLY Model Population Data POPDEN Average Regional Population 
Density
29 Basis Shielding and Exposure CSFACT Cloudshine Shielding Factor
30 PROTIN Inhalation Protection Factor
31 BRRATE Breathing Rate
32 SKPFAC Skin Protection Factors
33 GSHFAC Groundshine Shielding Factor Table
34 Emergency Phase RESCON Resuspension Conc. Coef.
35 Resuspension RESHAF Resuspension Conc. Half-Life
36 Emergency Duration of Early Phase ENDEMP Duration of the Early Phase
37 Scenario 1 Hot Spot Reloc. Time TIMHOT Hot Spot Relocation Time
38 Hot Spot Reloc. Dose DOSHOT Normal Relocation Dose Threshold
39 Normal Relocation TIMNRM Normal Relocation Time
40 DOSNRM Hot-Spot Relocation Dose Threshold
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The remaining input parameters are examined to determine if they should have an uncertainty 
distribution. A description of each MACCS2 input parameter and their use in the code is 
provided in the DOE Toolbox document for MACCS2.11 In some cases, the recommendation is 
to maintain at a set value in all cases. After further review, only a small number of input 
parameters remained for further evaluation in the uncertainty analysis and are highlighted in 
Table 1.
3. Establish the Selected Input Parameters’ Uncertainty Distributions
The next step is to determine the input parameter’s respective uncertainty distributions and 
related input values must be determined and set. This needs to be technically justified, defensible, 
and retrievable.
A potential user error is to define distributions that lead to illegal values (e.g., a negative value 
for a parameter that must be greater than zero) or results in a LHS value outside the allowed 
input range. Either the run fails during input validation or an unphysical situation is calculated 
(i.e., the angle of the plume spread becomes greater than 180 degrees) causing the run to fail.
From this step, the following input parameters are selected for further analysis with the following 
uncertainty distributions:
Dry deposition rate: Loguniform distribution from 2.7e-6 to 0.025 m/s12, 13
Dispersion scaling factors: Uniform distribution from 1.38 to 2.51 for vertical dispersion 
(ZSCALE)11
Plume rise scaling factors: Uniform distribution from 0.1 to 10 (SCLADP & SCLEFP) 
While, it would be desirable to include the dispersion function input parameters (CYSIGA, 
CYSIGB, CZSIGA, and CZSIGB), an uncertainty distribution could not be found that also 
satisfactorily completed MACCS2 input validation. Once the NRC-sponsored MACCS2 
improvements have been completed and published, these input parameters will be revisited.
4. Correlating One Input Parameter Related to Another
For the case where one input parameter is related to another, the beta version of WinMACCS 
allows for assigning a correlation coefficient that then can force the LHS routine to sample each 
parameter in the same manner to avoid unphysical combinations (for example, one value is 
selected from the low end of the uncertainty distribution while the other is selected from the high 
end). For this example, the plume rise scaling factors were correlated to each other (SCLADP to 
SCLEFP) for consistency in sampling.
5. Perform and Document the Uncertainty Analysis 
The above sets of input parameter’s uncertainty distributions and values were entered into the 
baseline MACCS2 input deck. Each input parameter set was run separately along with a 
combined run when all uncertainty distributions were applied. Twenty MACCS2 
runs/simulations were performed for each uncertainty run. Graphical plots of the 95th quantile 
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peak dose for the 0.1 to 0.2 km sector from each run were generated (see Figures 1 through 4, 
note that baseline value was 1.12E-1 Sv for 1 PE-Ci or 11.2 rem/PE-Ci). 
Figure 1 Impact of the Dry Depostion Velocity on Uncertainty
Figure 2 Impact of the Plume Rise Scaling Factors for 
Stability Classes A-D and E&F on Uncertainty
Figure 3 Impact of the Dispersion Scaling Factor on Uncertainty
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Figure 4 Impact of All Evaluated Input Parameters on Uncertainty
The results demonstrate the dry deposition and plume rise scaling factors only have a small 
impact on the MOI consequence dose ratio (majority of the runs at the lowest two values and the 
highest values no more than a factor of 1.3 times greater than the baseline value). However, the 
deposition scaling factor, ZSCALE, could result in a range in uncertainty of the consequence 
dose ratio of approximately 0.3 to 2.3 times the baseline value. The overall uncertainty from all 
input parameters provides a range in uncertainty of approximately 0.2 to 2.8 times the baseline 
value where only 20% of the values are greater than the baseline value. While a limited case, this 
example is well within the new DOE standard’s predicted uncertainty for the χ/Q term.
CONCLUSION
For TRU waste facilities, the ability to quantitatively assess the uncertainty in an accident 
analysis may become available in the near future. First, the new DOE standard must be formally 
approved and released. This, in combination with site-specific scenario initial conditions, would 
allow for focusing the uncertainty analysis to a small number of key MACCS2 input parameters. 
Additionally, an uncertainty factor of two in the dispersion analysis is very small in comparison 
to conservatism on orders of magnitude in the ARF and RF from DOE-HDBK-3010 that is being 
set in the new DOE standard. Second, the NRC-sponsored improvements to MACCS2 must be 
completed and published. If similar to other NRC-sponsored codes, this should include a 
probabilistic MACCS2 user guide with technical recommendations for the selection and entering
of the uncertainty distributions for the key MACCS2 input parameters. However, the 
improvements to MACCS2 are to support NRC efforts for probabilistic assessments to support a 
performance or risk-informed regulatory framework. Thus, further assessment would be 
necessary to ensure this may be directly transferable to DOE accident analysis methodology. To 
this end, this study should be considered an initial demonstration of the usefulness of such an 
uncertainty analysis capability in the beta version of WinMACCS.
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